Local Voice and Rights in Practice: A Review of Initiatives to Strengthen Demand-Side Accountability in Tanzania

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ABSTRACT

The main objective of this study is to expand knowledge on the use of demand-side accountability (DSA) initiatives as a means to strengthen local government accountability in Tanzania. A conceptual framework is presented towards the beginning of the first chapter, which indicates the dominant theories related to DSA, including: alternative development, decentralisation, accountability and citizenship. Through an examination of these theories, the emerging argument is that although decentralisation has acted as a medium for DSA it has failed as a tool to enhance local government accountability (LGA). Furthermore, the neo-liberal undertones of the DSA discourse suggest that demand for accountability has been manufactured by donors and international agencies. To move the discourse away from this impasse, a new model - the citizens' accountability model - has been proposed, which includes three key themes: citizenship, democratic spaces and strategic partnerships. Four DSA initiatives are operationalised within this new model with the aim of increasing the influence of civil society on local government.

The research questions asked in the study are: **1.** "To what extent do decentralisation reforms meet their objective of increasing the responsiveness of LG to the community? **2.** How can the influence of demand-side actors (citizens and those who represent them or act on their behalf) on LG be increased?" Little research has been conducted into the use of DSA initiatives and their affect on accountability outcomes. Therefore, the study looks to uncover whether they are a viable means of enhancing LGA to citizens.

CONTENTS

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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

CR	Community Radio
CSCs	Community Score Cards
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DfID	Department for International Development
DSA	Demand-Side Accountability
GROs	Grass Roots Organisations
IOPA	Institute for Orkonerei Pastoralists Advancement
LGA	Local Government Accountability
LGAs	Local Government Authorities
LGC	Local Governance Code
LG	Local Government
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme
LPM	Local Print Media
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
ORS	Orkonerei Radio Service (ORS)
PEDP	Primary Education Development Project
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSRP	Public Sector Reform Programme
TAMWA	Tanzanian Media Women's Association
TAHEA	Tanzania Home Economics Association
TASAF	Tanzania Social Action Fund
WB	World Bank
UC	Unit Committee

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Demand-side accountability and decentralisation: defining the research questions

This study will review a range of approaches that aim to increase the accountability and responsiveness of LG to citizens through demand-side accountability (DSA) approaches. The subject has been chosen because of the present widespread admission in development circles that decades of development approaches have failed and alternative types are therefore being sought (Pieterse, 2001). One of the alternative forms is the idea of bottom-up development which encourages participation of civil society - a collective term to refer to actors involved in change work without concern for political power, including, citizens, grass-roots organisations (GROs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) - in the development process (Desai & Potter, 2002). It is suggested that within this paradigm citizens may be more able to demand greater local government accountability (LGA) (Pieterse, 2001).

There is limited history of significantly empowered - the processes that lead people, elected officials or otherwise, to perceive themselves as able and entitled to make decisions (Desai & Potter, 2002) - local governments in Africa. In rural Tanzania specifically, the process of democratic decentralisation - the type of decentralisation that is concerned with political and not just administrative and fiscal aspects (Bergh, 2004) - to LG that responds effectively to the needs and priorities of its citizens is yet to be realised. District officials are accountable to an elected council to ensure that the interests of citizens are always considered. However, it appears that electoral democracy is still emerging, accountability pressures on councillors between elections are very weak and there is poor local scrutiny of government plans or performance by either the media or civil society. The result is a LG which is not subject to much accountability pressure at all and responds more to the interests of central government than to the local community (Taylor, 2008; Prud'Homme, 2003; Ahluwalia & Zegeye, 1998). To counter the issue of poor LGA, which is not only found in Tanzania but throughout the world, a wide range of projects and programmes have already been implemented by a variety of actors. These actors include governments, multilateral aid agencies, and civil society organisations (CSOs) which include GROs and NGOs. The specific aim being to hold political institutions accountable to those who demand public services (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001).

The study's objective therefore is to investigate and evaluate DSA approaches in Tanzania. Paying particular attention to the process of decentralisation which will be argued has acted as a medium for their implementation. Moreover, the study will build on the experiences of actors in Tanzania and beyond to make supporting points. The aim being to uncover how DSA approaches can be strengthened to ensure greater LGA in Tanzania.

Accordingly, two research questions are explored, namely:

1. "To what extent do decentralisation reforms meet their objective of increasing the responsiveness of LG to the community?
2. How can the influence of demand-side actors (citizens and those who represent them or act on their behalf) on LG be increased?"

1.2 Research methodology

Promoting accountability of LG to citizens has traditionally occurred through local elections, strong and active opposition parties, media, public meetings and formal redress procedures (Blair, 2000). However, newer and more active forms of DSA initiatives are being developed (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999). Due to the magnitude of these projects and programmes, an investigative approach will be adopted to increase understanding of four specific methods to promote DSA pressures on local

government. These include: community radio (CR) and local print media (LPM), community score cards (CSCs), public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) and capacity building for grassroots organisations.

While a survey of the literature on DSA and decentralisation provided the theoretical-conceptual foundation for the study (Siddiquee, 1994), the methodology was based on multiple examples of known DSA projects and programmes. The examples are based on published and unpublished literature which has been obtained through an NGO working on DSA issues and through wider secondary research. Since the analysis is developed from the case study material, the methodology involved the collection of instances of 'demand' and 'accountability' initiatives, their classification by type and purpose, and the application of a comparative analysis. The cases are not a random selection of 'demand' and 'accountability' mechanisms. Instead, they are a purposeful sample, chosen subjectively for their positive and negative attributes of which a range of services and categories of intervention are covered (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001).

This study uses the terminology of 'demand' to refer to instances where civil society -including local people and CSOs - commands more accountability from local government. The term 'accountability' is used to identify where LG has orientated towards the needs and priorities of local people.

The research undertaken in this study addresses the research questions by employing four key objectives: 1) Defining the concept of DSA and decentralisation 2) Elaborating on the discourse of citizenship, democratic spaces and strategic partnerships as a means to strengthen DSA 3) Uncovering the potential of previous DSA projects and programmes 4) Obstacles presented to civil society in adopting constructive DSA initiatives. The connection between each objective is to establish a better understanding of the broad theoretical and practical issues concerned with effective DSA initiatives in order to strengthen their impact on LG in Tanzania.

The limitation of the methodology was that the case examples are largely descriptive and not explicitly analytical. Therefore, correlations are often drawn rather than casual processes (Bardhan, 2002). Moreover, many DSA projects and programmes are under-researched and inadequately documented (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001).

1.3 Structure of the thesis

Chapter 1: Introduction

The initial chapter summarises the major points of investigation - it explains how the study will review initiatives to strengthen DSA in rural Tanzania and the role of decentralisation as a medium. The research questions are also presented. Finally, the methodology describes how the study was designed and organised and further alludes to a number of objectives which help to address the research questions.

Chapter 2: Literature review

This chapter begins by presenting a conceptual framework which illustrates the critical themes related to DSA. Then DSA is linked with developmental theory by providing a critical analysis of DSA and decentralisation. Accountability will feature as a wide-ranging term because it is inextricably linked to decentralisation and often expressed as a specified term of 'notions of accountability' (Prud'Homme, 2003; Smoke, 2003; Seabright, 1995). Therefore, decentralisation and accountability will be discussed together. The objective of this chapter is to provide a wider critique on the discourse of DSA. Highlighting issues concerned with the appropriateness of decentralisation as a reform to strengthen LGA and penultimately to reconceptulise DSA as citizens' accountability through strengthening citizenship, identifying the use of democratic spaces and strategic partnerships. Finally, a new model

for citizens' accountability is presented. The overall aim of the model is to strengthen civil society so it is more able to demand LGA.

Chapter 3: Presentation and analysis of DSA approaches

Case examples are presented under the following DSA approaches: CR and LPM, CSCs, PETS and capacity building for grassroots organisations.

This chapter will provide an initial overview of DSA and decentralisation in Sub-Saharan Africa and Tanzania to broaden understanding of the current level of LGA. This leads towards the discussion and analysis of the four DSA approaches which are presented through various case examples. The aim of which is to uncover the most appropriate mechanisms to strengthen the accountability of LG to citizens in Tanzania.

Chapter 4: Synthesis of DSA approaches and conclusions

Following chapter 3, this chapter draws some comparisons of the approaches through a matrix which uses four descriptive indicators to express means of increasing accountability. Then, common factors that appear to influence the success of the approaches are discussed, before moving on to the lessons learnt. Finally, the conclusion will uncover whether the research questions have been proved or disproved.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter lays down the basis of the study by defining the concepts of DSA and decentralisation and critically appraising them. The first section presents a conceptual framework which illustrates the crucial themes related to DSA. The second section defines DSA, highlighting how it has emerged through alternative development before linking it with decentralisation. The third section defines decentralisation and highlights its various forms. Moreover, it links decentralisation with accountability by recognising that accountability is supposed happen as a result of decentralisation by bringing decision making closer to the people. However, the nature of accountability relationships suggests that this is problematic. Finally it provides a critical analysis of decentralisation. It suggests that elite capture and issues of corruption and dis-trust in Tanzania have led to unsuccessful attempts at decentralisation and thus impacted on DSA. The fourth section argues that DSA and decentralisation are part of a wider neo-liberal orthodoxy constructed by donors and development institutions. In response to these critiques the fifth section builds a case to reconceptualise DSA as citizens' accountability through the paradigm of strengthened citizenship, democratic spaces and strategic partnerships.
A model is presented to illustrate what a new paradigm for DSA might entail. The aim being to move the discourse away from neo-liberal based orthodoxy and back to accountability that is demanded by citizens.

2.2 Toward a framework for DSA

The following model - constructed for the purposes of this study - represents the four crucial themes related to DSA, alternative development, decentralisation, accountability and citizenship. The proceeding discussion considers each of these themes and links them in a way to provide understanding of how DSA has evolved as a discourse in international development and what part the process of decentralisation has played.

The recognition of a model or framework gives focus to the research and identifies related discourses, thus providing grounding for the developing theory (Laws, Harper & Marcus, 2003).

Tab.1/1: Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework will now be explained. The framework illustrates the dominate discourses emanating from DSA[1]. Although the theory of alternative development has been widely critiqued in development literature, for the purpose of this study it is suggested that it embeds itself in DSA as part of an approach to emphasise peoples' capacity to effect social change through direct participation in the development process (Pieterse, 2001). The link with decentralisation illustrates the mode of reform which has been used as a vehicle to devolve political, fiscal and administrative power to LG (Smoke, 2003). The primary aim - alluded to in this study - being to hold LG to account for its actions towards civil society. This is why the link between decentralisation and accountability is inextricable because they are mutually reinforcing. Finally, the role of citizenship - a medium of collective action to address issues of disadvantage (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2001) - is connected to alternative development because of ideas related to participation and the basic needs of individuals. The relationship between citizenship and accountability is identified between public service providers and their users. Again, a two-way link demonstrates their causality to one another (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2001).

2.3 DSA defined

At the core of the conceptual framework presented in table 1/1 is DSA. DSA focuses on holding the institutions of civil society accountable to those who demand public services and not those who supply it (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001). Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) go further to say that it is born out of the need for democratic governance which aims to encourage accountability, with specific attention given to mobilising civil society.
A definition by Cornwall and Gaventa (2001:17) summarises the point,

> *"…increasingly discussions of governance and accountability focus on forms of broader interaction of public and private social actors, especially at the local level. Citizen participation in this sense involves direct ways in which citizens' influence and exercise control in governance, not only through the more traditional forms of indirect representation…"*

Now that DSA has been defined the following discussion aims to link DSA with alternative development as depicted in the framework. Alternative development imbeds itself in DSA by emphasising peoples' capacity to effect social change through direct participation in the development process (Pieterse, 2001). Some theorists, including Pieterse (2001), Carmen (1996) and Nerfin (1977) argue that it offers a more comprehensive look at development practice by broadening its methodology which is geared towards bottom-up participation, basic needs and rights-based approaches (Pieterse, 2001). This is in contrast to traditional development that is considered to have a largely economic focus and top-down nature (Desai & Potter, 2002). So does this mean that alternative development has different goals to traditional development? or is it just another way of achieving the same goals of traditional development but through participatory methods and people-centred approaches? (Pieterse, 2001). Whatever the line of questioning, what is apparent is the break with the practice of purely neo-liberal - market-based economics - to that of a more social approach to development (Kothari & Minogue, 2002). Central to this shift was the emergence of governance as a new subject in development cooperation, which Gaventa and Valderrama (1999:4) define as,

> *"…both a broad reform strategy, and a particular set of initiatives to strengthen the institutions of civil society with the objective of making them more accountable, open and transparent and more democratic…"*

It may be argued that strengthening institutions accountability and encouraging peoples' participation - the active contribution and involvement of people in development decision making at all levels of society (United Nations Report, 1979) - through the alternative development discourse constitutes the beginning of the DSA discourse. However, Kothari and Minogue (2002) criticise the participatory aspect

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[1] The framework offers a simplistic take on the relationships proposed and a more extensive account of their intricacies will be discussed throughout the chapter.

of DSA. They argue that where participation is instrumental, whereby it increases the efficiency of development programmes it persuades citizens to buy into donor projects, by sharing costs for example. This argument suggests that participation is being used as a means by which Western donors meet their ends of enforcing Eurocentric ideals on developing countries. On a more positive note, the transformative aspects of participatory development suggest that citizens may actually be empowered by the process of engagement in development project(s) and maintain control of the changes occurring in their community long after the project has ended (Johnson & Mayoux, 1998). In keeping with this positive notion of participation, decentralisation will now be discussed as one of the most popular reforms that has opened up spaces for wider and deeper participation of citizens at the local level and contributed to the DSA discourse (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999).

2.4 Decentralisation defined

Decentralisation is represented in the conceptual framework as the mode of reform which has sought to increase LGA by devolving power to local, provincial or regional governments. According to Prud'Homme (2003) and Smoke (2003) decentralisation is a complex, multifaceted and ambiguous concept. It is both a system and a process. The system aspect refers to a decentralised system of government channeling power down to lower tiers of government. As a process, decentralisation means to move from a centralised system of government to a decentralised system of government. Decentralisation as a system is the focus of this study.

There are a wide number of definitions that attempt to define decentralisation. However, the following by Rondinelli and Cheema, both prolific writers on decentralisation, seems to be the most representative.

> *"…the transfer of planning, decision making, or administrative authority from the central government to its field organisations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organisations, local governments or non-governmental organisations…" (Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983:18).*

A closer look at both of these definitions reveals that there is a concurrent theme running throughout, i.e. the devolution of power for decision making and deconcentration of administration for the management of public services from central government to lower level organisations (Siddiquee, 1994). This catch all term for decentralisation has been rejected by Mahwood (1983) who observes decentralisation as structures of government at local levels which are autonomous from central government and have the power to decide on a multitude of public issues. This definition is more in keeping with the idea of decentralisation as devolution which Rondinelli went on to discuss in his writings.

Moving on from defining decentralisation the following table 1/2 illustrates the various forms of decentralisation and their characteristics, the aim being to broaden understanding of the range of reforms. Prud'Homme (2003) and Smoke (2003) suggest that bias towards any one of these instruments can cause decentralisation to fail.

Tab.1/2: Forms of Decentralisation

TYPES OF DECENTRALISATION	CHARACTERISTICS
Fiscal -	The transfer of responsibilities, including sectoral functions, as well as the handing-over of own-resource revenues to sub-national government (Smoke, 2003).
Institutional -	The administrative bodies, systems and mechanisms - both local and intergovernmental - that help to support the process of decentralisation

	(Smoke, 2003).
Political -	The ability of LG to act on the needs and preferences of local people better than central government (Smoke, 2003).
Deconcentration -	The redistribution of administrative responsibilities only within central government. No formal government structure is put in place (Mahwood, 1983; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983).
Devolution -	The process through which central government resigns certain functions or creates new levels of government that are outside its direct control (Mahwood, 1983; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983).

In summary, decentralisation is the mode of reform which has sought to increase LGA by devolving power to lower levels of government. The aim of which is to bring decision making closer to the people, thus enhancing DSA. Table 1/2 illustrated the various modes of decentralisation and it was highlighted that bias towards any reform could be detrimental to its success.

2.4.1 Linking DSA and decentralisation with accountability

Thus far, DSA has been defined and linked with decentralisation as a vehicle to bring decision making closer to the people. Referring back to the conceptual framework it is also evident that inextricably linked to DSA and decentralisation is accountability. Accountability is discussed before the main critiques of decentralisation because it is a central theme running throughout the study and therefore it needs to be defined and its place within DSA and decentralisation understood.

Accountability in development has been robustly linked to two key objectives, the promotion of good governance - an agenda promoted by donor agencies and development institutions as a prerequisite to aid assistance - and democracy. To meet these objectives decentralisation is used as the mode of reform and the means by which to strengthen LGA (Bergh, 2004).

Brinkerhoff (2001) arguably offers the most comprehensive definition of accountability. He includes three themes in his definition. Namely accountability is; *answerability*; being accountable suggests having the obligation to answer questions regarding decisions and/or actions; *enforcement/sanctions*, the ability of overseeing actors to enforce sanctions for illegal or inappropriate actions; *locus of accountability*, identifying where the accountable and overseeing actors are positioned within the governance system (both within government, horizontal and outside government, vertical) and their relationships with each other. However, Newell and Bellour (2002) offer a more succinct description and suggest that accountability is to make certain that those who exercise power on behalf of others are answerable for their actions. This offers a more simplistic take on accountability but one that is vitally important as it alludes to the power relations between actors.

In summary, by observing the aforementioned definitions it is clear that accountability is multi-dimensional and complex. It also demonstrates the potential for large power differentials between horizontal and vertical actors. Furthermore, due to the array of actors the dimensions of accountability may constantly change. For example, in some cases actors may be accountable to more than one set of stakeholders, which could be problematic.

Continuing with this line of thought, it is clear that introducing decentralisation reforms to stimulate DSA inevitably reshapes accountability relationships. This is particularly noticeable in the public sector and with local populations (World Bank, 2004). There are three categories of actors held accountable for policy and programme decisions and who form these accountability relationships. These actors include; politicians and politically appointed leaders; public officials and agencies; and finally, NGOs, CSOs, the private sector and citizens. But to whom are these actors accountable to? Four categories of actors represent those whom accountability is owed, including; state agencies of restraint, citizens and CSOs, marginalised society groups and international actors (Brinkerhoff, 2001). However, what happens when

demands for accountability in the above relationships are pulled in different directions? The issue of power comes into play, for example it is often alleged in development projects that the implementing agency demonstrates more accountability to meet the donors' requirements than to the citizens (Newell & Bellour, 2002). It may be argued that power relations in accountability continue in the absence of universal standards or agreed measures of what is fair in accountability. Thus, it is used in a discriminatory way, where different standards are set for different actors dependent on the political goal to be achieved (Newell & Bellour, 2002). In order to centralise this power, Newell and Bellour (2002) suggest making a deeper analysis of the relationships between citizenship, participation and accountability. As citizenship brings accountability and participation together wider questioning of who has the right to hold to account and who should be held to account is permitted. In understanding these processes, one may be able to ensure that power is exercised in the interests of all especially citizens and marginal groups.

Taking the nature of accountability relationships further the World Bank (2004) report argues that more attention should be paid to the institutional relationships in which actors are accountable to each other. The five features of this important relationship include *delegation*, where citizens choose an executive to manage the tasks of the municipality, including tax and budget decisions, which represent *finance.* Furthermore, the executive acts, often in ways that involve the executive in relationships of accountability with other, *performance*. Voters than assess the executive's performance based on their experience and *information* and finally they act to control the executive, either politically or legally which constitutes *enforceability* (World Bank, 2004).

To summarise, decentralisation reshapes accountability relationships but not always in the intended direction i.e. in favour of citizens demanding more LGA. Demands for accountability can become conflicted and issues of power differentials between donor and recipients come into play. This means that it is important to recognise the dynamics of accountability relationships and understand that any weaknesses can cause service failure. Therefore, each feature of the accountability relationship needs to be carefully nurtured.

2.4.2 Main critiques of decentralisation

Now that decentralisation has been defined, linked with accountability and proposed within the discourse of DSA, the following discussion will aim to deconstruct decentralisation, uncovering its goals and elements to engage in a wider discussion about its utility with respect to DSA. It is hoped that the following debate will inform better understanding of whether or not decentralisation increases the responsiveness of LG to the community.

There are both advantages and disadvantages associated with decentralisation. The potential advantages of decentralisation according to Bergh (2004) and Rondinelli (1999) include bringing political representatives closer to the people to ensure better mobilisation and provision of resources at the local level. Also, more innovative decentralisation programmes may be developed - through local experimentation - which may increase responsiveness to local peoples' needs and requirements and enhanced opportunities for citizens to participate in decision making. These advantages are however countered by potential problems. According to Bergh (2004) devolving administrative responsibilities without adequate financial resources may result in unfair distribution of services. This could be purposeful in an attempt by central government to re-centralise or hold on to power. Moreover, weak administrative and technical capacities at local level may result in poorly delivered services. Finally, elite capture, where decentralisation may allow functions and benefits to be captured by local elites instead of increasing accountability at the local level can potentially lead to decentralisation of corruption and issues of dis-trust.

One of the prominent issues concerning the ability of decentralisation reforms meeting their objective of increasing the responsiveness of LG to communities in developing countries and specifically in Tanzania is linked to 'elite capture' (UNDP, 2004; Bardhan, 2002; Jacobsen, 1999). In Tanzania, 'elite

capture' takes the form of 'party regimes' whereby central government has used decentralised structures to renew or strengthen ruling party power and influence at the local level. This leads to a situation where the influential take over local power structures to create and sustain power bases in the countryside (Crook, 2003). Hence, the goals of decentralisation are self-fulfilling towards elected officials and not in line with accountability towards citizens.

Evident within 'elite capture' is the issue of corruption. There is a common belief that decentralisation and government corruption are closely related (Fisman & Gatti, 2002). The type of decentralisation that takes place has an impact on corruption. For example, deconcentrated decentralisation[2] evident in Tanzania in the late 1960s, constituted a mere shifting of administration without the full power of devolution to make it effective (Mahwood, 1983). It could be argued that this led to openings for corruption because institutions and local officials were not equipped to deal with new levels of responsibility. Furthermore, a centralised bureaucracy of this nature, which has merely deconcentrated administrative duties downwards, cannot be monitored by central government owing to high costs of communication and difficulty carrying out audits of service delivery patterns. Thus, bureaucrats are able to extort customers in their role as monopoly providers of public services (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006). In contrast to this position, *The Untied Nations Development Programme (2004)* suggests that gradations of decentralisation forms - or Decentralised Governance for Development (DGD) – can strengthen LGA. For example, under administrative decentralisation participatory budgeting can be used to make the local administration more accountable to citizens in the absence of an elected LG (UNDP, 2004).

The extent of 'elite capture' by local elites on LG depends on a variety of factors. Firstly, the level of social and economic inequality within communities, secondly customs of political participation and voter understanding, thirdly equality and regularity of elections and transparency in local decision making processes and fourthly government accounts and the media. Local structures of accountability are often not robust enough in many developing countries to counteract elite capture. Therefore, for decentralisation to be effective serious attempts to change the power structures within communities and local institutions must be addressed to improve opportunities for participation (Bardhan, 2002).

Moving on to the issue of dis-trust, which can emulate from citizens if they believe that LG is corrupt, a comparative study by Jacobsen (1999) found that newly democratised countries, in this case Tanzania, demonstrate a trust-deficit in the new democracy. There is no common definition of trust but for the purpose of the study it will be taken to mean that a person exhibits trust if they believe that another actor (person, group or institution) is acting in their best interests. In terms of the trust deficit or levels of trust in Tanzania one must look at the national history of the country. The end of the colonial period of the 1950s saw decentralisation as a policy of colonial rulers and as the new democracy formed, out of the need to accumulate central power, support from lower levels of government was withdrawn (Mahwood, 1983). This suggests that dis-trust of government is embedded in the colonial history of the country and without full devolution decentralisation in this respect has failed to increase the responsiveness of LG to the people.

To summarise, there are both advantages and disadvantages associated with decentralisation. The predominant advantage is that of bringing political representation closer to citizens. However, it could be argued that this positive aspect is outweighed if the form of decentralisation is not accompanied by robust administrative and technical capacities. Furthermore, it appears that decentralisation has the potential to be used by those in positions of power to exploit the benefits associated with decentralisation reforms. The result is corruption and distrust which ultimately impedes participation of citizens in issues that affect them, leading to an ill equipped civil society unable to demand LGA. Thus, decentralisation in its current form(s) has failed to meet its objective of making LG more accountable. All of these issues can be associated with Tanzania at present.

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[2] Please refer to Tab.1/2 for a full definition of deconcentrated decentralisation.

2.5 DSA and decentralisation as part of neo-liberal orthodoxy

The following debate further supports the argument that decentralisation reforms have not met their aim of increasing LGA. Cammack (2002) argues that DSA and decentralisation are part of the neo-liberal orthodoxy, which is concerned with capitalist accumulation and not with improving LGA. The neo-liberal orthodoxy is currently driven by the WB and its contemporaries through decentralisation reforms that emphasise democratic or 'good governance'. It is pushed by two factors, firstly neo-liberal restructuring and secondly the perceived failure of the central state, especially in Africa (Dauda, 2004; Wunsch & Olowu, 1990).

In support of good governance Tendler (1997) and Bergh (2004) suggest it can be used to strengthen accountability conversely by recentralising the state. In Brazil, for example, the central state acted as an overall monitor to hold providers accountable to citizens where LG did not have the resources or capacity. Furthermore, problems regarding favours which were demanded by citizens from patrons were identified. LG officials believed that this issue would not be so prevalent if some degree of power was recentralised (Dauda, 2004). This raises the core issue of the need to develop political relationships between the patron/client in which accountability is public and universal not personal. This suggests that a more pluralistic approach for improving decentralisation reforms and DSA is required by strengthening all institutions simultaneously because these institutions mediate the relationship between providers and users (Dauda, 2004; Brett, 2003; Saito, 2003).

Taking the aforementioned points into consideration and referring to the earlier discussion about DSA, on the surface DSA appears to come to fruition through participation and rights-based approaches associated with the alternative development discourse. However, through Dauda, Cammack and others it becomes apparent that DSA is an extension of decentralisation where the demand for accountability is donor-driven and not necessarily initiated by local people. Testament to this is the *Governance and Transparency Fund* created by the UK's Department for International Development (DfID). On the surface the fund is commendable, it is designed to assist citizens to hold their governments to account. However, proposals to obtain funding are only allowed from organised bodies and for sums of money over 1 million (DfID, 2006a). This type of initiative is only likely to reach and be utilised by already mobilised CSOs and NGOs, potentially excluding the most marginalised in society.

In summary, it could be argued that good governance is simply a strategy of influence by the West (Grindle, 2004; Driscoll & Evans, 2005). Good governance appears to be too focused on the level of the state and as this study suggests the reform should focus more on strengthening the accountability of local institutions through DSA approaches at the local level[3].

2.6 Repositioning DSA as citizens' accountability

In order to develop a more genuine discourse on DSA which moves away from neo-liberal orthodoxy and towards a method of accountability driven by civil society, the following discussion highlights the need to reposition DSA as citizens' accountability. This concept suggests strengthening the discourse on citizenship (which is the final discourse alluded to in the conceptual framework in table 1/1) encouraging civil society to create and engage in more democratic spaces and for all actors to engage in strategic partnerships.

2.6.1 Strengthening citizenship

Citizenship has a long disputed history and has many values attributed to it in democratic theory. For some theorists, citizenship implies a set of individual rights and for others it is a broader set of social and civic responsibilities. However, more recently some theorists have argued for a linking of the two traditions, which Lister (1998:228) broadly defines as, "…citizenship as rights which enables people to

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[3] The DSA initiatives will be discussed and analysed in chapter 3.

act as agents…" This idea appears in development under rights-based approaches to development[4] (Gaventa, 2003; DfID, 2000; UNDP, 2000). By using the rights approach actors can exercise direct ways in which to influence and exercise control in governance, not only through the more traditional forms of indirect representation but also through DSA initiatives (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999). This argument has moved on however, Chambers (2004) asserts that rights are no longer enough to demand accountability from government and that there ought to be an obligation based approach which encourages those who "have", to encourage and empower those who "have not". Although Chambers offers a laudable change of focus to the rights-based approach the reality of achieving a universal code of human obligations is extremely problematic. Therefore, citizenship as agency which is suggested by Jones and Gaventa (2002) and Cornwall and Gaventa (2001) offers a broader definition which provides scope for addressing and redressing the involvement of citizens in the decisions that affect them. Citizenship as agency is the definition adopted by this study.

A method to strengthen citizenship thus increasing LGA may be to build up the capacities of civil society. The vehicle of civil society as a means to enhance DSA Clark (1995) argues is largely neglected. He describes civil society as a function that entails moving from a "supply side" approach, concentrating on project delivery, to a "demand side" emphasis, helping communities articulate their concerns and participate in development processes. As well as individuals, CSOs play a major role in advocacy and representation of citizens between central and local institutions. Their main concern is to ensure that people - in particular vulnerable groups - become more involved in the decisions that affect them, thus encouraging them to demand more LGA.

However, Goetz and Gaventa (2001) are concerned that CSOs are becoming co-producers of what were state functions. Essentially, the state has off-loaded their social responsibilities to civil society and therefore is less accountable than before. Furthermore, Roy (2008) suggests that where community organisations have been assertive, government institutions have not been better orientated to their demands. In fact they are better placed to exploit intra-elite conflict and develop alliances with a division of the elite and thus influence service delivery to meet their own ends. Moreover, Freidman (1992) suggests that CSOs, in their intermediary role, lose the true essence of the issues they are advocating on behalf of the marginalised in translation. He maintains that the disempowered need to develop a voice of their own and not rely explicitly on CSOs. In order to move past the impasse representation by these contestations a definition of civil society that closely reflects the power relations of all those actors involved and one which is country specific and mobilises individuals as well as CSOs should be adopted (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001).

2.6.2 Democratic spaces to increase citizens' accountability

The works of John Gaventa - which compliment the alternative development discourse - consider democratic spaces as a means to influence civil society institutions. He suggests that these new spaces have been opened up due the uprising of civil society as a response to undemocratic economic development (Gaventa, Smith & Willingham, 1990). The following quote sums up this position.

New spaces for participation are characterised, "…not only by demands for redefining the very basis of economic priorities and economic decision making. Indeed the failure of the dominant economic policies to provide fair and equitable economic change presents the community as "contestable terrain", a legitimate arena for grassroots action and dissent…" (Gaventa et al, 1990:286)

Gaventa (2003) suggests that these participatory spaces must be examined in order to be credible. He identifies four types of spaces for analysis which are found in the political arena. First are closed spaces which are still inherent in decision making and do not permit inclusiveness or a broadening measure of participation. Second are invited spaces where people are asked to participate by various

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[4] Please refer to the conceptual framework at the beginning of the chapter which illustrates the place of rights-based approaches in relation to DSA.

authorities, including government, supranational agencies or NGOs. Third are claimed or created spaces which are taken from more powerful holders or created through community mobilisation around a common concern. Although these democratic spaces have increased accountability from LG as Dauda (2004) suggests, Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa (2001) warn of the potential for these spaces to be inhabited or constructed by power relations. Therefore, understanding power relations in democratic spaces is critical to understanding how spaces for participatory governance can be used for dramatic changes in engagement or whether they are more simply instruments for reinforcing control (Gaventa, 2003).

Taking power relations and how spaces are constructed into consideration is plausible. However, spaces for engagement are still essentially driven by the state. Therefore, this study argues that more created spaces are needed and a change in attitudes from the powerful actors that engage in the invited spaces is required to encourage citizen voice and mobilise civil society to increase LGA (Brock et al, 2001).

2.6.3 Pluralisation of relationships and strategic partnerships

According to Dauda (2004), Brett (2003) and Saito (2003) decentralisation measures are not confined to one dimension only. Instead they result in a pluralisation of relationships. Through this pluralisation of relationships Saito (2003) argues that strategic partnerships emerge. Saito's work on decentralisation and development partnerships in Uganda highlights the potential of strategic partnerships to aid the processes of decentralisation. He effectively argues that decentralisation attempts are made more successful through partnerships, thus resulting in enhanced LGA. The aim of these partnerships is to harness mutually beneficial outcomes. Partnerships are defined as reciprocal relations among diverse actors to reach common goals and are based on the equal participation of autonomous organisations.

There are four types of strategic partnerships that Saito (2003) identified in the Ugandan example which helped to meet the objectives of decentralisation and which this study suggests may be used in the context of Tanzania. Firstly, enhanced relations between the state and LG through the harmonisation of the budgetary process were identified as the main contributing factor to fiscal decentralisation success. Secondly, the relationship between the government and the private/NGO sector at the local level was also developed. Forums were convened which provided an opportunity for the exchange of information - with particular regard to planning and budgetary mechanisms - this enhanced the responsiveness of services to citizens. Thirdly, strategic relationships between service providers and recipients were harnessed due to the belief of citizens that collaboration yields common benefits, particularly in universal services such as education. Fourthly, the formation of associations of local authorities was found to be particularly effective in its advocacy role of communicating the demands of local people to central ministries (Saito, 2003). In order to achieve successful strategic partnerships three factors are required: 1) incentives - which encourage actors to make partnerships and share relevant information for collaboration; 2) - Information, the sharing of information which discourages conflicts among actors leading to; 3) Conflict resolution mechanisms (Saito, 2003).

Building on a more pluralistic approach to decentralisation through strategic partnerships between institutions and actors is the final link in the chain which started with strengthened citizenship and the suggestion of more democratic spaces. The objectives being to move beyond the impasse associated with DSA as neo-liberal orthodoxy and encourage citizens' accountability. This should strengthen LGA.

The following model, created for the purposes of this study, presents a clear picture as to what a new framework for DSA might resemble if the aforementioned themes are collaborated.

This model illustrates what DSA should now resemble in a theoretical sense. The proceeding chapter will aim to operationalise the four DSA approaches - alluded to in the methodology - in this new model.

Tab.1/3: Model for Citizens' Accountability

2.7 Conclusion

The analysis of this chapter shows that theorists have conflicting views about the applicability of decentralisation as a reform to strengthen LGA in developing countries. From a traditional development perspective some theorists view decentralisation purely from a normative point of view and overlook problems associated the implementation of different forms of decentralisation. Moreover, insufficient implementation of decentralisation reforms has resulted in poor levels of participation by local people. The result is a poorly mobilised civil society unable to demand LGA. The alternative development school of thought suggests that participation can be used to strengthen the objectives of decentralisation but critics point to the use of participation as a means to gain power and control by local elites. The conclusion therefore suggests that decentralisation has generally failed to deliver more accountable local government. This, however, is quite an extreme position and does not provide any space for the positive attributes of decentralisation. Thus, neither school of thought, positive or negative, has complete supremacy.

In terms of DSA which was prompted by decentralisation and appeared to emerge through the alternative development discourse, further analysis has argued that it is part of a wider neo-liberal orthodoxy developed by donors and development institutions. Thus, suggesting that demand for accountability has been manufactured by Western development agencies who adopt a Eurocentric outlook. In response to this, the study suggests reconceptulising DSA as citizen's accountability by strengthening citizenship, paying more attention to creating spaces for local people to command accountability and building on pluralism through strategic partnerships. With this in mind, the model in table 1/3 was introduced to offer a new framework for DSA, which will operationalise the four DSA approaches that are to be discussed in the next chapter. The overall objective of the framework is to strengthen civil society in such a way that LGA increases.

Chapter 3

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DSA APPROACHES

3.1 Introduction

The following chapter briefly discusses the background of decentralisation and local governance in Sub-Saharan Africa and Tanzania, the aim being to highlight that decentralisation has not necessarily improved LGA to date. In order to improve LGA to citizens a number of DSA approaches have been utilised by donors and CSOs. With this in mind, the main focus of the chapter will be to review four DSA approaches and present a number of examples for analysis to evaluate their effectiveness with regard to increasing citizens' accountability[5]. The first approach is CR and LPM, the second is CSCs, the third is PETS and the fourth is capacity building for grassroots organisations.

3.2 Decentralisation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Due to the legacy of colonialism in the 1950s, which was traditionally against decentralisation, Sub-Saharan Africa remains rather centralised (Mahwood, 1983; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). Colonial powers did not want to concede power to LG in case control of the country was lost. However, there was some degree of local autonomy which was inherited by the new independent government the first few years after independence although this varied in different settings (Prud'Homme, 2003; Mahwood, 1983). In recent years a degree of decentralisation has been introduced in many African countries. Local governments are in place where they were not present before and locally elected mayors have replaced centrally elected mayors. However, the range of decentralisation approaches is diverse and there is insufficient evidence that it has resulted in policies that are more responsive to the people. Moreover, the belief that LG will be more concerned with social equity still has to confront popular expectations of local representation inclusive of disadvantaged groups. Thus, more remains to be done to introduce effective decentralisation reforms across the continent (Prud'Homme, 2003; Crook, 2003).

3.2.1 Decentralisation and LG in Tanzania

Tanzania tends to view decentralisation as an ideal model for development. Since independence, various decentralisation measures have been adopted by the government to promote urban and rural development. However, although central government administrative structures have improved through decentralisation reforms, actual participation by citizens in the development process has not been realised. The reason can perhaps be traced back to the original form of decentralisation which took place between 1972 and 1982, namely, deconcentration. This mode of decentralisation was not as robust as full devolution of power through local level democratic institutions (UNDP, 2002). The result was an administrative structure that had not been developed sufficiently to establish the mechanisms required to ensure increased decision making power of local people. Moreover, planning, budgeting and project identification were done by central ministries without the knowledge of local needs and priorities (Rondinelli, 1983).

Prior to deconcentrated decentralisation reforms being introduced in Tanzania a comprehensive LG system was already in place (Tanzania Local Government Office, n.d)[6]. The current Tanzanian model of LG is divided into 133 districts, municipalities, cities and towns, known as Local Government Authorities (LGAs), each with its own elected council (Taylor, 2008). The model which was re-established in 1982 after the decentralisation era has a poor image among local people who view it as an instrument of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party to control and obtain compliance from rural people. There is a strong sense of elite capture and local people are deeply suspicious of the

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[5] Please see appendix 1 for a matrix which shows the range of case studies analysed for this study categorised by type of initiative.
[6] Please see appendix 2 to view a table of the evolution of local government in Tanzania.

relationships between Councillors, rich traders and land owners (Crook, 2003; Munkandala, 1998). Furthermore, there is a notable difference between richer, urban districts and poorer, rural districts in the degree of contacts and consultations between elected officials and local people, in favour of the former. To reflect this, in a survey carried out by Munkandala (1998) when asked which groups 'benefited from decentralisation', 32% said that the peasantry had and only 28% named workers and labourers. Despite this poor representation of decentralisation reforms in Tanzania, the people do not want LG to be abandoned they want it to be more democratic and accountable.

In response to these concerns and as part of the government of Tanzania's fight against poverty, the ruling party (CCM) published the Policy Paper on Local Government Reform in October 1998 with the aim of making local authorities more efficient, effective and accountable (Taylor, 2008; Tanzania Local Government Office, n.d.) Within this reform the Government's Decentralisation by Devolution (D-by-D) policy, requires LGAs to play an important role, particularly in the delivery of services. Furthermore, the reforms have created important new spaces for civil society to engage with the budget process (Taylor, 2008). Despite these strides forward more needs to be done in order to make Tanzania's decentralisation reforms effective and LG more accountable. The involvement of local people directly or through democratically elected representatives is imperative (Crook, 2003). The following discussion outlines the use of DSA approaches to increase LGA, the most important element of each being the express involvement of civil society.

3.3 Community radio (CR) and local print media (LPM)

The following discussion looks at the scope for CR and LPM to be used as a tool for people to demand more LGA in Tanzania. CR and LPM help to ensure open and transparent government by providing information on a mass scale. They are used as information and education tools, which are accessible for all regardless of their social or economic status. If democracy is to truly take root in Tanzania and have meaning beyond the formal electoral process, CR and LPM is essential (Bussiek & Bussiek, 2004).
The role of CR in development has become widely recognised. Its messages are able to reach diverse people in urban and rural areas who are often illiterate and are not reached by other media (Siemering & Fairbairn, n.d.). Furthermore, this type of information dissemination is a very viable option in terms of cost and is broadly applicable to a range of sectoral issues such as health, agriculture, nutrition, civic education, environmental protection and family planning (DfID, 2006b; Bussiek & Bussiek, 2004). The very essence of CR can be summarised by the following five components, it must be: *available* to the community so that they can participate in programmes; *accessible* so that community members can reach the station and benefit from it; *affordable* to the community; *acceptable* to the community by catering to everyone's needs being sensitive to social differences; *and accountable* to the community it serves (Bussiek & Bussiek, 2004).

Along these lines, the following CR case study represents a developmental approach in keeping with providing information while promoting change and strengthening peoples' voice to demand accountability. The Orkonerei Radio Service (ORS) in Terrat, Tanzania was established by the Institute for Orkonerei Pastoralists Advancement (IOPA) in partnership with the local community and donors. Although the station is a partnership it is run essentially by the community. ORS aims to improve the quality of life of dry-land pastoralists in Northern Tanzania by broadcasting information and education on areas of need, including; health; environmental issues; laws and rights; and farming methods. It also promotes change by encouraging pastoralists to attend school and older people to take up vocational education and places strong emphasis on gender equality.

What makes this station a particularly successful example of the CR approach is ORS's fundamental concern with increasing peoples' voice through participation of the community in developing program schedules and content. Furthermore, listeners are invited to use the station for lobbying for better public services, particularly transport which is key to improving the lives of the marginalised in Northern Tanzania (Siemering & Fairbairn, n.d.).

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A further important component of CR is that it is owned, managed and shaped by the people it serves. CR services are usually managed and controlled by a board democratically selected by members of the community and legally constitute a voluntary organisation set up by the community (Bussiek & Bussiek, 2004). However, although the actual initiative to start a service may come from within the community there are instances in Africa and Tanzania specifically where international agencies have set them up to purport their own agendas or where governments have aired party political broadcasts (Bussiek & Bussiek, 2004). An example of the first point is the Africa Good Governance Programme, *On the Radio Waves,* which was launched by the WB in 2006. The distance learning programme was aired on the Africa Learning Channel to municipalities Tanzania. The main objective of the project was to support LG capacity building and community empowerment via dissemination of information related to anti-corruption, civic participation and fiscal decentralisation. However, the programme was not designed in collaboration with citizens and was also only broadcast in English thus excluding large groups of people (The Communication Initiative Network, 2004).

The second point, regarding governments using CR to air party political broadcasts, was found in Mozambique's 2003 local elections. Initially the radio programmes were used to encourage citizens, particularly women, to take part in the election process. However, bias towards various political parties in certain programmes became evident, despite the development of a code of conduct for electoral coverage (The Communication Initiative Network, 2004). The reason why many CR stations are captured by government propaganda in particular is related to financial support. Funding a proper on-air studio costs around $18,000 for analogue and $20,000 for digital and although initial costs are usually provided by donors, the community is responsible for maintaining the station. Therefore, CR stations may be willing to take cash from political parties to supplement their income (Bussiek & Bussiek, 2004).

Moving on to LPM, many newspapers have sprung up since the establishment of multi-party politics in 1992. There are over 450 registered publications which include magazines, periodicals and newsletters. However, there are also numerous publications circulated by CSOs who are beginning to realise the power of LPM to voice development concerns and encourage civil society to mobilise around issues that are of importance to them (Swanston, n.d). One such example is the case of TAMWA (the Tanzania Media Women Association), which has been singled out because it has demonstrated an impressive capacity in policy advocacy in Tanzania. TAMWA's aim is to use media to sensitise society on gender issues and advocate and lobby for policy and legal changes which favour the promotion of the rights of women and children (Kiondo, n.d). One of their key campaigning strategies is to use national and local newspapers to feature articles on issues such as gender violence and the Sexual Offences Act. Moreover, they use promotional and educational material including the publication of the popular Sauti ya Siti magazine to raise awareness and act as a mobilising tool for collective community action against gender violence (Kiondo, n.d).

A further example of LPM which goes beyond Tanzania and may be used as a positive example in practice is the case of the Ugandan government's newspaper campaign to reduce elite capture. The aim of the campaign was to boost schools' and parents' ability to monitor local government officials' handling of a large school grant programme. Information on central government transfers was made available to all, at both the national and local level through newspapers and in the schools through notice boards. Capture was inevitably reduced because local officers knew they would be identified and held accountable for any fund deficits. This strengthened accountability by government over LG and also empowered citizens at the local level if discrepancies were found in the information posted on school boards (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005a). Another anti-corruption programme, which highlights the utility of this DSA approach, is the FIX Nigeria Initiative. The CSO led programme worked with a range of actors, including the youth, the media, faith-based organisations, trade unions and the private sector to develop media campaigns and increase capacity in anti-corruption reporting with a view to combating corruption in government and promoting transparency and accountability (The Communication Initiative Network, 2008).

Overall, what makes this approach successful is its reach, involvement of civil society and ability to address a number of social, economic and political issues. However, CR, by its nature, serves a certain community only, be it geographically defined or created by common issues. Therefore, it does not serve the population as a whole and thus may have limited capacity. This is where it would be useful to bring both CR and wider print media together to reach a wider audience. In addition, the approach is open to capture by development institutions and government who pay CRs and the print media to purport their own agendas - present in both the Africa Good Governance and Mozambique Local Election examples. The result is an approach which is not accountable to local people but to the institutions that support it. To overcome this obstacle it is vital that the community is central in the organisation and maintenance of the project or programme as demonstrated by the ORS in Tanzania. The transparency of this DSA approach is also fundamental to its success. Transparency was inherent from the start of the FNI project due to the range of actors that were willing to be involved, moreover deeper transparency and accountability was also introduced through investigative reporting which led to exposing corrupt practices in LG and the private sector.

Moving on to the theoretical linkages between decentralisation, accountability and participation, CR and LPM faces a paradox. On the one hand, purely community driven media projects have the potential for transparency but due to issues of funding are not able to produce the scale of projects which significantly impact accountability. On the other hand, if the project uses donor funding their programmes are more likely to have a bigger impact on accountability but the demand for accountability is driven by donor priorities as illustrated by the Africa Good Governance programme (Cammack, 2002).

Decentralisation follows a similar contradiction. Again in the Africa Good Governance project one of the aims was to provide information about fiscal decentralisation. One of the key policy areas of fiscal decentralisation in particular is political efficiency which aims to increase local participation (Smoke, 2003). However, the project itself barely engaged civil society in its organisation or maintenance. Furthermore, it may be argued that the form of decentralisation - fiscal - was not appropriate for Tanzania. Due to existing problems of poorly articulated roles and resource deficiencies within the Tanzanian LG structure, which could have been compounded. This is why fiscal decentralisation should always be implemented with clearly defined political and intuitional forms of decentralisation and not just one type of decentralisation (Smoke, 2003).

Finally, in terms of operationalising this DSA initiative into the citizens' accountability model in Table 1/3 more attention needs to be paid to the direct participation of citizens in CR and LPM projects and the freedom in which citizens have to exercise their voice (Gaventa, 2003). This is made easier when development institutions and governments' are not in control of the project. Along these lines, Van Zyl (2005) argues that CR and LPM has the potential to rebuild civil society through well structured programming, news and interaction with the community. However, although information dissemination and lobbying is inherent in this DSA approach there is no formal method of bringing citizens together or to meet elected officials. Therefore, democratic space is unlikely to be opened up and strategic partnerships may not flourish (Saito, 2003; Gaventa, 2003).

In summary, CR and LPM are vehicles for development promotional campaigns and tools for information dissemination and lobbying for change to a wide audience. The initiative can cover a range of development issues and is relatively affordable and accessible. However, the main lesson to extract from the analysis is that the initiative needs to be fully supported and maintained by the community without too much intervention from development institutions or government agencies. Finally, CR and LPM can be operationalised within the new citizens' accountability model if a more formal nature of community gatherings and meetings with other actors is adopted.

3.4 Community Score Cards (CSC)

The proceeding debate looks at the capacity of the CSC process to increase the influence citizens have on local government. The CSC, like CR and LPM is another methodology for demanding local level accountability. It is also gaining in practice, particularly in rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa with the World Bank as a key supporter (Amin, Das & Goldstein, 2007; Sundet, 2004). The approach is essentially a community monitoring tool which mixes the techniques of social audit and community monitoring by facilitated discussions in focus groups to bring out qualitative assessments on projects, processes or service provisioning (Sundet, 2004; Singh & Shah, 2003). CSCs are being used with increasing frequency, largely due to the relatively short time required for implementation, which ranges from three to six weeks. The information collected during focus group discussions is area specific and may be aggregated to provide information at various levels, including municipality, city and state (Amin et al, 2007).

There are both advantages and disadvantages to the CSC method. The advantages include: firstly the opportunity to give civil society (citizens and CSOs) a role in scrutinising local governance procedures; secondly that the information is specifically focused on the interests of the citizen; thirdly is the potential to mobilise citizens by showing them how they can contribute to improvement in the local area; and fourthly the ability to institutionalise the findings of the scorecard with LG support (Bovaird et al, 2003). However, the disadvantages of the approach suggest that there is potentially too much information to be handled easily and it may put pressure on the integrity of local organisations which are funded by the local authority or other local public agencies, because they have to make assessments of the performance of that agency (Bovaird et al, 2003).

Moving onto the main components of the method there are four in total[7] which include; the input tracking scorecard; the community generated performance scorecard; the self-evaluation scorecard by service providers; and the interface meeting between service providers and the community which allows for immediate feedback (Singh & Shah, 2003). The aforementioned stages of the CSC process require considerable preparatory groundwork as well as follow-up activities towards institutionalising the process into governance, decision making and management of service provision at the local level. Thus, overall the CSC process has six stages, all of which are summarised in Table 1/4 (Singh & Shah, 2003).

STAGES INVOLVED IN CSC IMPLEMENTATION	CHARACTERISTICS
Preparatory Groundwork -	• Sector for evaluation is acknowledged (health, education ect) • Sample space of village clusters is defined • Community leaders and NGOs and CSOs invited to assist in implementation • Community meeting held to draw out community perceptions (broad participation is crucial) • Stratification of the community based on usage of the service either through field visits and informal interviews or by existing social mapping data
Development of the Input Tracking Scorecard -	• Obtain supply-side data on service inputs, budgets and entitlements • Take the above information to the community and project staff and tell them about it (community find out their rights and providers their commitments) • Participants are divided into focus groups based on their involvement with the project (i.e. user, provider ect) and then asked to provide different information regarding the various inputs

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[7] Please see appendix 3 for a model depicting the CSC process.

	• Using the supply-side information and the discussions in the sub-group a set of measurable input indicators are devised
	• An input tracking scorecard is generated by recording the scores the focus groups give to each indicator[8]
Generation of the Community Generated Performance Scorecard -	• The community is classified into focus groups by degree of usage of the service. Each group should have a mix of gender, age and occupation
	• Facilitators use lead-in questions to stimulate group discussion in order to develop performance criteria
	• Community generated indicators are finalised and prioritised and should not exceed 5-8.
	• Facilitators ask focus groups to score each indicator[9]
	• Remarks are asked to ascertain the reasons for scoring
	• Community is asked to come up with their own suggestions for the improvement of the service
Generation of Self-Evaluation Scorecard by Facility Staff -	• To get the perspective of the service providers, the first stage is to choose which facilities will undertake self-evaluation
	• Facility staff brainstorm to establish their own set of performance indicators
	• Staff fill in their relative scores for each of the indicators they devised
	• Facility staff are asked to remark on their scores and suggest way to improve the state of service delivery
Interface between Community and Facility Staff -	• Preparation for the meeting requires both sides to be sensitised to the feelings of the other by sharing the results of the scorecard
	• Users and facility staff share their views equally; political leaders or government officials act a mediators and provide legitimacy
	• The implantation team facilitates dialogue between both sides to form a list of concrete changes that can be implemented immediately
Follow-up and Institutionalisation	• Local governments and district assemblies are required to create forums for feedback from communities via the CSC so that performance based policy action can be taken
	• Regional or national governments integrate CSC findings into their decentralisation programme, by making the results from the scorecards the basis for allocation of resources or performance based incentives
	• Community organisations train their staff on how to use a conduct a CSC to be used on a sustained basis
	• Links made with existing community organisations to use their knowledge in the CSC process
	• Disseminate information of the CSC via CR and LPM to promote indirect uses of the data

The summary of the above components gives an overall idea of how a CSC works in theory; the following case studies however represent how the approach has faired in practice. The CSC process has already been put into practice in Tanzania by a number of CSOs. A particularly successful CSC identified by Sundet (2004) was carried out by HakiKazi Catalyst, a leading Tanzanian CSO. The aim of the project was to devise a scorecard which enabled the communities involved to evaluate the progress

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[8] Please see appendix 4 for an example of an input tracking scorecard
[9] Please see appendix 5 for an example of a CSC.

of the government's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process and to "exact social and public accountability". An interesting part of the methodology of this exercise was the combination of the scorecards with self-evaluation forms for participating local government officials. This enabled honest and probing exchanges between the local communities and the officials. Furthermore, a preliminary analysis of the findings indentified that LG was definitely failing in its duties towards citizens. This was established by poor funding in service provision and a lack of transparency regarding receipt and use of funds at local level (Sundet, 2004).

However, the reason why this example stands out is the hybridisation between the CSC and the Citizens Scorecard approach. The Citizens Scorecard method concentrates its unit of analysis at the household/individual level rather than the level of the community through questionnaires. It is also for use at the macro level with a longer lead time, where feedback comes in the shape of media coverage (Thindwa, Edgerton & Forster 2005). By combining the advantages of the two approaches the data collected can be more readily aggregated and compared between localities (Sundet, 2004). Although, Amin et al (2008) argues that the use of aggregated assessments of service quality means there is the possibility the views of some individuals or groups may dominate those of other individuals.

Another example of CSC in practice which goes beyond Tanzania and may be used as a successful example is the Local Government Enhancement Project in Ghana. The Northern Ghana Network for Development initiated a CSC project to strengthen civic participation in local government. The Network Secretariat worked with one of their member organisations to build a CSC that would assess the performance of District Assemblies. The Unit Committee (UC) is the level of LG closest to the people in Ghana, but unfortunately, Unit Committees (UCs) often struggle to know what their role is. By providing training in the CSC method, this project helped to give UCs a role: ensuring that District Assemblies are accountable and provide quality services (*Community Scorecards, n.d*).

The aforementioned examples of the CSC approach should be met with a degree of caution. This is because although the examples offer insights into how to increase the influence citizens have on LG, the projects - and others in the developing world - they are led or influenced by the WB. Therefore, unlike in the first approach (CR and LPM) where demand for accountability has the potential to start at the grassroots, demand in the CSC approach is invariably top-down and manufactured by Western ideals about good governance (Crook, 2003). Hence, the CSC approach may be seen as part of the wider neo-liberal discourse to push decentralisation and other Western restructuring reforms on developing countries (Dauda, 2004; Wunsch & Olowu, 1990). One such example is the WB project in collaboration with The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) who did a preliminary field study on the education and health sector in Bagamoyo, Tanzania before training other NGOs in the method (Thindwa & Singh. 2003). A further issue associated with the WB CSC method is that it looks mainly at how to improve the delivery of services and not the processes associated with effective delivery. A CSC project performed by the UK Audit Commission, however, not only gained understanding of citizens opinions of LG service delivery but also assessed the quality of government processes. Since there is increasing evidence that improving services without improving LG processes is not likely to reverse trends in decreased levels of confidence in the public domain and trust in local politicians and officials (Bovaird et al, 2003).

Taking the above discussion of the examples into account, there are a number of factors that appear to influence the success of the CSC method. First is the short time required for implementation, second is that the information generated is area specific which can be aggregated to provide information at various levels, including municipality, city and state. Moreover, importantly it mobilises citizens around particular issues, thus enhancing their capacities to demand more accountability and unlike CR and LPM the interface meeting ensures that there is democratic space for citizens to raise their concerns. However, this approach is also subject to a number of obstacles, including heavy donor input which was evident in the TASAF example and would be difficult to overcome as the approach has been adopted so widely by the WB. Also, the approach focuses too heavily on service delivery without considering how to strengthen the processes which may enhance delivery. The TASAF example also

illustrates this point. Finally, the key lessons that can be learnt form this approach is that although it generates substantial information there is too much information to be aggregated easily. To overcome this - as demonstrated in the HakiKazi Catalyst example - one could combine the methodologies of CRC and CSC to provide better management of information.

Moving further into the analysis of the approach, the theoretical linkages between decentralisation, accountability and participation are highlighted by taking a closer look at the processes of LG in Tanzania. Historically decentralisation reforms have failed in Tanzania to significantly strengthen institutions to enable them to deliver services effectively (Mahwood, 1983). What is required for service delivery to be successful is institutional decentralisation, where effective accountability relationships are harnessed between government levels, civil service officials and elected representatives. If structures and processes are incorrectly designed and implemented, and local competences to manage political and fiscal functions of LG are not available, decentralisation will fail and thus LGA will not be realised (Smoke, 2003). Furthermore, examples where large cross sections of civil society were included - HakiKazi Catalyst example - in the process the more likely the community were able to demand accountability. Moreover, the different stages of the CSC allow for enhancement of accountability relationships, from the level of the community to that of service providers and local politicians and officials. Finally, institutionalisation of the CSC approach as a community framework for monitoring and evaluating enforces LGA. In terms of participation, civil society should be aware that this approach is open to project capture by donors and therefore before the project begins a process of agreement on measures of what is fair in accountability relationships should be met (Newell & Bellour, 2002).

In terms of operationalising this DSA initiative within the new citizens' accountability model in Table 1/3, the six stages involved in the generation of the scorecard help to embed citizenship by bringing individuals together to talk about their needs and priorities. Moreover, the interface meeting opens up democratic space in which to demand accountability from service providers. Finally, the overall process may provide the kind of environment where strategic partnerships between actors thrive (Saito, 2003). It may be argued that the CSC approach is more robust than the CR and LPM method because there is a tangible process in which civil society can increase their influence on local government. Furthermore, converting the outcomes of the CSC into concrete policy may prove to citizens that LG is listening to their needs and priorities. Thus, challenging the growing consensus, particularly in Tanzania that LG is not accountable (Crook, 2003; Munkandala, 1998). If these circumstances are acrimonious civil society may be strengthened.

In conclusion, perhaps the most robust and constructive use of the CSC method is not just to use it as a mechanism for citizens to demand LGA but also as a means to assist LG in understanding better their role as a provider and to identify their place in the community. However, the capacity of CSC as a tool for enhanced LGA should be met with caution as the approach is driven largely by the neo-liberal undertones of the WB. Thus, it is important that civil society is mindful of the influence donors may have on the project and take the necessary measures to define what is fair in their accountability relationship. Finally, the approach appears to fit efficiently into the citizens' accountability model due to its meticulous processes which include participation of civil society at every juncture, ensuring democratic openings and space to build strategic partnerships.

3.5 Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)

The following discussion looks at the scope for PETS to be used as a mechanism for citizens to demand more LGA in Tanzania. Originally PETS were carried out by donor agencies to trail their funds, however recently they have also been adopted by governments in developing countries, development agencies and CSOs to increase the accountability and responsiveness of LG (De Graf, 2005). In Tanzania specifically, PETS has been used as part of the government's major reform programmes, including the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) and the Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP) to strengthen service delivery in response to citizens needs (Sundet, 2004). The rationale behind the approach is that by demonstrating how money is spent or transferred at different

bureaucratic levels, the local decision makers can be held to account by civil society and a deeper understanding of the existing degree of accountability to civil society can also be uncovered. Moreover, by making the tracking information available to local decision makers they can be empowered to hold their administrative bureaucracy to account (De Graaf, 2005; Sundet, 2007).

Moving on to the main components of the approach, there is a linear methodological process that each PETS undertakes. First a research team consisting of external consultants or employees of a government statistical office (but *not* officials of the ministry or local government department concerned with the chosen service for evaluation, due to results bias) begins by holding consultations. The study team then identifies the issues and problems that most affect the chosen sector through dialogue with a range of stakeholders - a statement of the study's objectives is then finalised (Reinikka & Smith, 2004). Following this, a set of questionnaires is drafted corresponding to different tiers of the hierarchy and categories of respondents, while recruiting enumerators - piloting of the questionnaires than takes place. The sample, carefully formed into status groups that are representative of the country, should allow cross-validation of data between different tiers of government. The team then conducts the relevant interviews and retrieves data from the institutions related to the service under review (i.e. schools, local government), before, analysing the results and attempting to answer the research questions. Hence, PETS are a multiangular data collection strategy (i.e. a combination of information from different sources) which circumspectly considers which sources have incentives to misreport (Reinikka & Smith, 2004).

Now that the basics of the approach have been detailed the following discussion turns to the impact of the approach in practice. The first study, conducted in Tanzania, successfully documents how a PETS identified the degree of LGA to citizens in Tanzania. The PETS was conducted by five Tanzanian NGOs to identify whether or not previous PETS had contributed to accountability at district level in Tanzania (De Graaf, 2005). The framework of analysis used for the study was the World Development Report (World Bank, 2004) description of accountability relationships[10]. The relationships analysed were between four actors, including; citizens and clients; politicians and policy makers; organisational providers; and frontline providers (teachers, nurses and pharmacists). The outcomes of the accountability relationships were mixed (de Graaf, 2005). Firstly, community empowerment to demand accountability (*enforceability*) was poor. Of all of the initial PETS only one was successful in increasing enforceability and that was achieved by the NGO organising recurring community training sessions and meetings to inform citizens about their rights and provide basic budgetary analysis training. Secondly, accountability of elected leaders to citizens (*informing*) also showed little evidence to suggest increased accountability through PETS. Although the leaders appreciated and used the information provided by the PETS, it has not changed their attitude towards informing the community rather they use the information to enhance their relationship with organisational providers. Thirdly, all PETS successfully empowered elected officials (councillors and street leaders) to demand accountability from organisational providers (*enforceability*). Information generated by the survey was welcomed by the councillors and street leaders and used to raise concerns and demand explanations from organisational providers. Fourthly, the accountability of providers to councillors and communities (*informing*) proved to be the weakest link in the accountability relationships. There was little evidence of any marked change in attitude and behaviour in terms of accountability and the willingness by organisational providers to participate in a survey or provide information was minimal. Fifthly, PETS did not increase responsiveness of frontline providers (*performing*) to citizens but it did clarify the role and highlight the difficulties faced by frontline providers to citizens (de Graaf, 2005). Overall, using PETS as an evaluation tool to measure its own success has provided unique insights in the accountability relationships that need to be strengthened in order to meet citizens' needs and priorities.

The above example goes some way to outlining the results PETS can have on relationships of accountability. However, the following PETS project from Peru makes a wider point about the potential of PETS to expose instances of corruption and issues of transparency, which are both prevalent in

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[10] Please see chapter 3 for wider discussion.

Tanzania (Sundet, 2004). A diagnostic PETS on education in Peru was performed by a number of social science researchers to gain wider understanding of budget formulation, resource allocation and opportunities for corruption present in the budget process. The aim of the survey was to formulate policy recommendations that would improve the process of transfers to schools (Reinikka & Smith, 2004). The study involved interviewing government officials, analysing government reports and statistics, education studies and also making exploratory visits to Regional Administration Councils Regional Administration Councils (RACs) and schools. The general findings of the survey were that spending per student on goods and services was extremely low. The main source of leakage was found in payroll and benefits which constituted to 90% of total spending (Reinikka & Smith, 2004). The study also uncovered a complicated mix of actors funding the education system in Peru, which is also prevalent in Tanzania (Sundet, 2007). The PETS was conducted at a time when decentralisation in Peru was underway and therefore relationships of accountability between actors were likely to be compounded. However, because civil society was funding the system disproportionately compared to government the argument for decentralisation is strengthened as a means to reverse the imbalance (Reinikka & Smith, 2004).

The aforementioned examples meet the aims of the approach in practice. However, the following study highlights problems with the approach. In 2002 a PETS was led by the WB with support of the Tanzanian government to measure leakage with regard to the Primary Education Development Project (PEDP). However, poor methodological practice meant that fund transfers were only assessed from the Ministry of Finance to schools. The consultants from the WB had not realised that both the Ministries of Education and Local Government had also disbursed funds to the PEDP, and what had originally been found in the PETS to be a minimal leakage was, in fact, considerable (Sundet, 2007). Overall, it appears that poor methodology and lack of communication between donor and host government caused the PEDP to fail.

Overall, what makes this approach a successful tool to enhance LGA in Tanzania is its ability to deconstruct complex accountability relationships to identify where they need to be strengthened and also to measure corruption and transparency at the level of an individual agent (Roberts, 2004). However, the approach has a number of problems. First, the methodological process is not robust. The process of gathering information from government officials and agencies is not transparent because it is subject to their discretion and therefore key financial information may be purposefully left out or bias (Roberts, 2004). Moreover, although the PETS data can usefully quantify capture of funds in a public programme it does not determine what actually happened to the funds after they had been captured (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005b). Second, the complex hierarchical modes of fund transfers make it difficult to track and keep track of funds. Third, translating the outcomes of the findings into concrete policy is problematic without political support, which will be limited if the PETS reveals significant corruption at the level of which support is required (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005b). Fourth and by no means least there is no formal mechanism to include citizens in the process. Taking all of these obstacles into account, potentially the only way to overcome them is to systematically reform political processes and restructure regulatory systems at the same time as raising public awareness through CR and LPM methods and create formal mechanisms to include civil society in the approach and provide training to increase their ability to demand LGA (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005b). The overall lesson to be learnt from this approach is that strong political will and a robust finance ministry, with linear methods of fund transference, all of which are essential for the approach to be successful (Roberts, 2004).

The theoretical linkages between decentralisation, accountability and participation with the PETS approach will now be considered. One might argue that the complex relationships between actors and the complicated funding streams endemic in both the Tanzanian and Peruvian examples are due to both poor decentralisation reforms and those reforms not having time to bed-in. In the case of Tanzania the deconcentrated and confused nature of Tanzania's many decentralisation reforms to date has contributed to this problem (Mahwood, 1983). This is because when deconcentration is used as a form of decentralisation the redistribution of administrative responsibilities only occurs within central

government. No formal LG structure is put in place. Thus, deconcentration is merely a guise which gives the illusion of an attempt at decentralisation but really constitutes a shifting of workload from the centre outwards (Mahwood, 1983; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). What is required is decentralisation by devolution (Taylor, 2008; Roberts, 2004) where central government resigns certain functions or creates new levels of government that are outside its direct control. Local units of government are therefore autonomous, independent and have corporate status to purchase resources to perform their functions (Seabright, 1995; Mahwood, 1983; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983).

In terms of accountability PETS has the potential to deconstruct accountability relationships and engage citizens directly in the workings of horizontal accountability institutions (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001). On the other hand, the approach does not seem to get to grips with encouraging the participation of citizens within the methodology, therefore a paradoxical situation arises. The answer may lie in combining the approach with other DSA approaches, including CR and LPM to alert citizens to instances of corruption and the CSC by using the community interface meeting element.

Operationalising this DSA approach within the new citizens' accountability model is met with some difficulty. As a tool on its own, it's potential to mobilise civil society to demand more LGA is weak unless combined with CR or LPM as a means of disseminating the results of the PETS and employing a mechanism, similar to the interface meeting in CSC, to bring service providers and citizens together to make space to voice their claims for funds (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005b).

To conclude, the two fundamental outcomes of a PETS which make it a useful tool for citizens to demand better LGA, is the ability to deconstruct complex accountability relationships and highlight instances of corruption where it may have occurred. However, methodologically it is flawed. There is no robust mechanism to ensure that information collected from various agencies is not bias and it relies heavily on political will and a strong finance ministry for the information to be valid and usable. Finally it is difficult to operationalise the approach in the citizens' accountability model because it does not explicitly engage with citizens. Moreover, the lack of information dissemination about PETS results and no formal meeting to discuss the issues highlighted means that new spaces and strategic partnerships may not be realised.

3.6 Capacity Building for GROs

The proceeding debate seeks to identify the capacity of GROs to act as a vehicle for citizens to demand more LGA. The relationship between the Tanzanian government and local CSOs (including GROs and NGOs) has not always been compatible but recently the government has promised to provide an "enabling environment" for this growing community (Lange, Wallevik & Kiondo, 2000). GROs are increasingly being seen as channels for promoting economic and social development and also contributing to democratisation of the economy, society and polity (Uphoff, 1993). Due to their bottom-up approach to development, GROs offer closeness to the people of local conditions, responsiveness to peoples' needs and information generation to help communities mobilise to demand accountability from service providers (Uphoff, 1993). Although there is no explicit statement by development agencies as to the function of GROs in development programmes (Lister & Nyamugasira, 2003) Kapiriri, Manyire, Hearn and Kanji (2000) suggest three potential roles: providers of the service of accountability; external monitors; and stimulators of demand among citizens for effective services.

The fundamental nature of GROs is to operate within networks of trust which are based on shared norms of which to achieve cooperative ends (Fukuyama, 2001). To meet these ends, GROs mobilise local resources and information to solve problems that require ongoing attention. Moreover, they build on their networks so that they can represent their members in dealing with regional and national agencies. Furthermore, the nature of GROs means that although they demonstrate common interests, like any group, conflict can arise, however the programmes they develop are also likely to catalyse further development initiatives (Brown & Ashman, 1996). Now that the characteristics of GROs have been defined it is important to understand the components required to stimulate capacity building. The

following components have been developed by PACT, Tanzania - a branch of an international NGO that works towards capacity building - and supported by USAID, as a guide to community mobilisation. The key components in the process include; designing ways for people to participate in policy debates and political processes through CSCs or Parent-Teacher associations for example; articulating the problem or situation which needs attention, clearly and forcefully; identifying key stakeholders and engaging them, thus highlighting the need for all actors to work together to solve the problem; establishing a common definition of the problem and all stakeholders identifying means for dealing with it; obtaining political and economic support for the planning process and action programme to be realised (Pact Tanzania, n.d.).

Along these lines, The Tanzania Home Economics Association (TAHEA) runs an infant care and support programme called *Mama Mkubwa* based on community guardians who volunteer to take care of orphans. TAHEA successfully mobilised the community by raising awareness on the extent of the orphans' problem in Makete, the child headed households, and the kind of support the vulnerable children needed and why the community should care (Pact Tanzania, n.d). This example has worked in one district of Tanzania. However, the following study - which may be used as an example of good practice for Tanzania - makes a wider point about the need for GROs to extend project reach to make a larger impact on capacity building.

The Assembly of the Poor is a loose farmers' network that uses mass agitation campaigns and sit-ins to get government and policymakers to consider the concerns of rural populations living in poor and insecure areas in Northeast Thailand. The features of the network which make it successful include: decentralised, locality-based organisation; diffused leadership; ability to mass mobilise; advocacy on both local and global issues; and the ability to negotiate with government officials. The main outcome of the Assembly has been to open up spaces for negotiation and recognition of rural issues to a level which was not possible before (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001). Although GROs have the potential to open up democratic spaces for engagement, as alluded to in the previous example, sustaining them is problematic and requires continued political cooperation (Roberts, 2004). This has been tackled in the Philippines by creating a Law called the Local Governance Code (LGC) which set up LG units and regulatory frameworks through which citizens and CSOs were vested with control over elected officials and public policy implementation. The LGC not only recognises the importance of participation of citizens in governance, but more importantly, it institutionalised the role of civil society groups in the mechanisms of local governance (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001).

In general, what makes this approach a successful tool for capacity building in communities is its explicit involvement of civil society in the formation and management of the organisation and its subsequent projects. Furthermore, it is responsive to peoples' needs, generates information, and creates democratic space to help communities mobilise to collectively change their circumstances and influence decision makers. However, there are a number of obstacles which constrain the influence GROs have on LGA. First, there are corrupt practices on the part of government officials. The perception of widespread corruption in Tanzania calls into question the issue of budget support and the expectation of whether GROs will be able to operate effectively as agents of LG (Crook, 2003; Lister & Nyamugasira, 2003). An unsuccessful GRO in Tanzania illustrates this point. The Mission for the Needy was set up to help those most in need at the grassroots level including women and young people. However, the Mission was accused of systemically misusing funds by one of its senior officials. Despite being cleared of the allegations by a government enquiry the public remain unconvinced of GRO transparency (Gibbon, 1994).

The second point which is also linked to corruption is the concept of democratic space available for GROs to operate. To a large extent, there is a widespread perception that space for GROs to influence policy has been expanding in Tanzania (Lister & Nyamugasira, 2003). However, due to the uninstitutionalised nature of the operating space it makes it difficult to advocate because politically powerful individuals can change policy decisions at any time (Gibbon, 1994). The third and final point relates to GROs that started at the community level but have since expanded their reach and become

embroiled in government working groups, thus compromising their position. Criticism is often levelled against them that they have become urban elites where the original representative structure at local level is not as extensive as they suggest (Goetz & Lister, 2001). In order to overcome these constraints, GROs must be seen to be more independent of government and transparent in the eyes of the communities they represent. Furthermore, institutionalising GROs into some sort of LGC, as depicted in the example of the Philippines, means that there will be democratic space by law attributed to citizens to enhance their influence on LG (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001; Gibbon, 1994).

Moving on to the theoretical linkages between decentralisation, accountability and participation, it may be argued that where decentralisation has failed to deliver LGA in Tanzania, GROs offer an alternative. They have the potential to encourage participation and mobilise communities (Dagnino, 2005). This is what is required to strengthen citizenship (a key component of the citizens' accountability model) which is attained through the practice of the different identities and struggles around important issues affecting civil society (Dagnino, 2005). However, relationships of accountability between actors at all levels are problematic. Local governments in Tanzania demonstrate corruption and the legacy of the Mission for the Needy has left citizens sceptical of both LG and GRO transparency (Crook, 2003; Lister & Nyamugasira, 2003; Gibbon, 1994). The relationships between all actors are further compromised due to the affects of being within a rentier state - those countries that receive external funds on a regular basis to support the state (Yates, 1996). Yates (1996) and Beblawi and Luciani (1987) argue that the entire social structure of many states in Africa is dependent on the inflow of external rent from donors and multinational corporations therefore it is difficult for citizens to demand accountability when their elected officials are not necessarily in control of public services. Moreover, due to the constant stream of economic rent, the state is liberated from the need to tax citizens, thus if citizens are not taxed their right to demand accountability is lessened (Yates, 1996).

Despite the aforementioned difficulties, the approach fits well into the citizens' accountability framework in Table 1/3. As Dagnino (2005) suggests the potential for civil society to enhance their influence on LG can be realised through mobilising communities and bringing them together. In turn, this may create democratic spaces for lobbying and foster strategic partnerships both with and without political support (Saito, 2003, Gaventa, 2003).

To conclude, the approach offers more than capacity building. GROs employ a number of different strategic approaches where decentralisation has failed to increase LGA, including collaborating with or challenging government and state authorities - as the Assembly of the Poor example illustrated - and advocating of peoples' needs and priorities - as the TAHEA initiative showed. However, the legitimacy of the approach is compromised by instances of corruption in Tanzania's LG and allegedly some GROs. Hence, citizens still feel some distrust towards GROs that appear to be agents of local government. Thus, GROs must ensure that project and programmes are transparent and maintain a representative presence at grassroots level.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has acknowledged that although decentralisation has been popularised in Tanzania, one of its key themes, increased accountability, has not been realised. Despite this there is still scope for decentralisation to work, particularly if the reform is decentralisation by devolution and if local people are involved directly or through elected representatives in deliverance of that reform. A way of achieving the latter is to encourage and strengthen the use of DSA approaches. Four such mechanisms were presented with examples from Tanzania and other countries to make wider points. The first, CR and LPM gave an insight into the effectiveness that widespread information generation can have in a development context, particularly by including marginalised groups. Arguably, the more informed citizens are about their rights the more likely they are to demand them. The second initiative, CSCs, represents a unique cross sector monitoring tool which is especially useful for identifying poor service provision. The third method, PETS enables citizens to track the flow of government funds, thus identifying corruption practices. Finally, various examples were presented to highlight ways in which to

build capacity for GROs. Mass mobilisation of citizens around the same issue and media support appeared to be the most effective tools within this approach to demand accountability.The following chapter synthesises the DSA approaches in order to gain wider insight into the common factors that appear to influence the extent of the approaches and the key points that should be considered when using the approaches in practice. Furthermore, an overall conclusion will be reached to establish whether the research questions have been proved or disproved.

Chapter 4

SYNTHESIS OF DSA APPROACHES AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 Synthesis of DSA approaches

In this study, data and space constraints have not permitted a rigorous analysis of the DSA approaches. However, it is hoped that by coupling the various approaches with respective case examples the study has established whether the approach in question has succeeded in achieving instances of "demand" and "accountability". To illustrate these instances and to draw on some comparisons the matrix of DSA initiatives and case studies[11] uses four descriptive indicators to signify means of increasing accountability - 1) information generation; 2) lobbying to influence planning and policy formation; 3) awareness raising and capacity building to mobilise; 4) and citizen-based monitoring and evaluation. The CSC approach is the only mechanism to meet the requirements of all four indicators. CR, LPM and capacity building for GROs follows by covering the first three indicators however the PETS approach only meets the first and fourth indicator. Along these lines, it may be argued that the CSC approach is the most comprehensive mechanism for increasing citizens' ability to demand better LGA. This approach must be met with caution and its examples critically appraised due to it close association with the WB which this study argues has created demand in line with neo-liberal restructuring in Tanzania. The PETS approach is least likely to enhance citizens' capacity to demand better LGA. It falls short due to the lack of sharing the results of the findings systematically with communities and there is also no formal method of mobilising communities or institutionalisation of any survey outcomes. To overcome this problem, PETS could be combined with CR and LPM to disseminate information about survey findings and also use the interface meeting element of the CSC to mobilise the community and meet with respective service providers.

Due to the unique elements and methodologies of each approach, particularly the CSC and PETS approaches, it has proved difficult to draw on many common factors that appear to influence the success of the approaches. However, there are two common occurrences that are worth noting. First is the ability of each approach to be adaptable and inclusive. The case studies chosen reflect only a small number of the services where DSA approaches can be used to enhance accountability. The mechanisms are also malleable to other services. Furthermore, the approaches exhibit gender sensitivity and inclusiveness of all citizens' including those in under-represented groups like women and youth. Second, it appears that it takes a relatively short amount of time for the effects of a DSA approach to be realised. Once the information has been disseminated or the results of a PETS or CSC are uncovered there is potential for citizen action. The issue is that not all of the approaches are able to utilise this potential and turn it into concrete ways forward to increase LGA.

Although there are few common factors associated with each approach there are a number of lessons that can be learned from using them to promote citizens' accountability. First is the need to ensure that all projects and programmes are inclusive of civil society, particularly in the conception, management and organisation. Also, those conducting the study should be aware of project capture by donors. Second is that a combination of the approaches is more robust, than the use of one. CR and LPM are the most flexible and can be used in conjunction with any of the approaches discussed. Third is that although there is the propensity for each approach to generate a substantial amount of information, this presents difficulties when trying to aggregate the data. Moreover, the information made available from LG or other government agencies to those undertaking the research may be bias and therefore hindered the validity of the data. Fourth, it is not enough to improve service delivery alone; one must also consider the processes involved in delivering enhanced services. Fifth, each of the approaches was evaluated in terms of its connection with a mode of decentralisation. What is apparent is that decentralisation with devolution combined with the DSA approaches is perhaps the best way forward to enhance citizens' accountability. Sixth, it is important to consider the accountability relationships

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[11] Please see appendix 5

between all actors, not just between LG and citizens. This is because the impacts of any one of the approaches may also be felt by other government agencies, the private sector and even donors. Thus, if there relationships are not monitored it could have a negative impact on citizens. Moreover, connected to this point is the need for those using the various approaches to develop their relationships to ensure that political will is notwithstanding. This should create more sustainable outcomes of the findings by converting results into policy processes.

4.2) Have the research questions been proved or disproved?

This study has proved that decentralisation reforms in their current state have failed to meet their objective of increasing the responsiveness of LG to the community. This is endemic in many developing countries, although this study has highlighted the issue with particular regard to Sub-Saharan Africa in general and Tanzania specifically. The mode of restructuring has not been successful for a number of reasons, including the many types of decentralisation reforms that exist and the differences in implementation practices between states. In Tanzania, the predominant difficulty with decentralisation is imbedded in its colonial history. Owing to a long period of confused and multiple varieties of reform, the most prevalent being deconcentrated decentralisation. The study also suggests that decentralisation has been used by Western donors, notably the WB, as a neo-liberal restructuring tool, which seeks to manufacture demand for LGA to meet its own ends. Although predominately negative connotations regarding decentralisation have been drawn, it does not allow for the positive aspects of decentralisation to be considered. Hence, decentralisation by devolution, which is argued to be the most appropriate form of decentralisation, due to its autonomy from central government, has been suggested as the form most likely to enhance LGA. This reform is being purported by the current Tanzanian administration. Undeniably, however, current decentralisation reforms have failed and therefore approaches to strengthen the influence citizens have on LGA have been adopted by donors and CSOs.

This leads to the conclusion of the second research question which has established that civil society, including citizens and those that represent them (CSOs), can enhance LGA through DSA approaches. The approaches were operationalised into an alternative model for DSA which seeks to break the current neo-liberal impasse with which it is concerned. The citizens' accountability model henceforth focuses demand for better LGA from the grassroots level by strengthening citizenship, creating more spaces for local people to command accountability and building on pluralism through strategic partnerships. The overall conclusion is that central to each and every DSA approach is the express involvement of civil society, without which LGA is unlikely to be increased.

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
Appendix 1
An Overview of Local Government in Tanzania

Episode	Comments
Pre-colonial era	Chiefdoms, and councils of elders
German era (1884-1917)	Mainly direct rule but also limited urban authorities
British era (1918-1961)	• Native Authorities encouraged since 1926 (Indirect rule) • Township Authorities for large urban areas • Municipalities Ordinance 1946 • Local Government Act 1953
First decade of independence (1961-1971)	• Chiefdoms abolished • Inclusive Local Authorities encouraged • Local governments overwhelmed by duties, with limited resources • Rural Authorities abolished 1972, urban Authorities abolished 1973
The decentralisation era (1972-1982)	• A system of deconcentration of government replaced the comprehensive local government system which had existed for a decade
Reinstitution of LG (1982-1995)	• Urban councils (Interim Provisions) Act 1978 required that town and municipal councils be re-established from July 1 1978 • 1982 comprehensive local government legislation passed • 1984 comprehensive system of local government re-established
Local Government reform (since 1996)	• Comprehensive programme of reforming local governments to make them efficient, effective, transparent and accountable embarked upon

Source: Tanzania Local Government Office, n.d

Appendix 2

The stages involved in implementation of a CSC

Source: Singh & Shah, 2003

Appendix 3

An Example of an Input Tracking Scorecard (based on education)

Input indicator	Entitlement	Actual	Remarks/Evidence
Textbooks per child			
Children per class			
Sanitation Facilities			
Furniture per classroom			
Wages of Teachers			

Source: Singh & Shah, 2003

Appendix 4

An example of a CSC within a community focus group for Health in Malawi

Community Generated Data	Scores: 1 Very Bad	2 Bad	3 OK.	4 Good	5 V. Good	Remarks
Availability of staff						
Availability of ambulance						
Availability of drugs						
Availability of furniture						
Attitudes of staff						

Source: Singh & Shah, 2003

Appendix 5
DSA initiatives and respective case studies

DSA Initiatives	Means of increasing accountability			
	Research for advocacy (information generation)	Lobbying to influence planning and policy information	Awareness-raising and building capacity to mobilise	Citizen-based monitoring and evaluation
Community radio and local print media	Orkonerei Radio Service, Tanzania	Fix Nigeria Initiative (print media)	Orkonerei Radio Service, Tanzania	
	Africa Good Governance Programme, (*On the Radio Waves*)	Community Radio in Mozambique's 2003 local election	Africa Good Governance Programme (radio and print media)	
	The Tanzanian Media Women Association (TAMWA) (print media)	The Tanzanian Media Women Association (TAMWA) (print media)	The Tanzanian Media Women Association (TAMWA) (print media)	
			Community Radio in Mozambique's 2003 local election	
Community Score Cards (CSCs)	HakiKazi Catalyst, Tanzania	CSCs for UK local services	HakiKazi Catalyst, Tanzania	HakiKazi Catalyst, Tanzania
	Local Government enhancement project, Ghana		Local Government enhancement project, Ghana	Local Government enhancement project, Ghana
	The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) CSC on health and education		The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) CSC on health and education	The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) CSC on health and education
	CSCs for UK local services		CSCs for UK local services	CSCs for UK local services
Public Expenditure Tracking (PETS)	Multiple NGO PETS study on LGA, Tanzania			Multiple NGO PETS study on LGA, Tanzania
	PETS for Education, Peru			PETS for Education, Peru
	PETS for education, Tanzania			PETS for education, Tanzania
Capacity building for grassroots organisations	The Tanzania Home Economics Association (TAHEA)	The Tanzania Home Economics Association (TAHEA)	The Tanzania Home Economics Association (TAHEA)	
	The Assembly of	The Assembly of	The Assembly of	

	the Poor, Thailand	the Poor, Thailand	the Poor, Thailand	
		Local Governance Code, Philippines	Local Governance Code, Philippines	
	The Mission for the Needy			

Source: Adapted from Goetz & Gaventa, 2001: 15